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Abstract 
This paper explores how borrowers’ financial and personal information, loan characteristics 
and lending models affect peer-to-peer (P2P) loan funding outcomes. Using a large sample of 
listings from one of the largest Chinese online P2P lending platforms, we find that those 
borrowers earning a higher income or who own a car are more likely to receive a loan, pay 
lower interest rates, and are less likely to default. The credit grade assigned by the lending 
platform may not represent the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. We also find that the 
unique offline process in the Chinese P2P online lending platform exerts significant influence 
on the lending decision. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of big data-
based lending markets.  
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1. Introduction 
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending has recently emerged as a new form of loan 
origination for the credit market. According to Lin et al. (2009) and Bachmann et al. (2011), 
it is defined as peer-to-peer unsecured lending between lenders and borrowers through online 
platforms without the involvement of financial institutions. This type of lending marketplace 
is designed to supplement traditional bank lending in order to meet the small-loan needs of 
individuals and small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs), which often encounter difficulty in 
borrowing money from traditional lending institutions.  
Since the first online P2P lending platform, Zopa, was established in the UK in 2005, 
numerous P2P lending platforms have emerged all over the world, such as the Prosper and 
Lending Club in the US, isePankur and Auxmoney in Europe, SocietyOne in Australia, and 
Renrendai and CreditEase in China. Concurrently this market has grown exponentially2. 
Within these platforms borrowers generally make their personal and credit information – 
including a description of the reason for borrowing, current financial situation and 
demographic characteristics – available to potential lenders as the main indicators of 
creditworthiness. The platform can quickly assess and assign risk grades through the use of 
information technology Instead of relying on delegated monitoring with banks as 
intermediaries, lenders have the opportunity to process the financial and personal information 
                                                             
2 In the UK, the peer-to-peer lending industry lent more than 2.2 billion GBP in 2015 and this number is more than twice that 
of the previous year, according to the figures released by the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association (P2PFA). In the US, loans 
originated by P2P lenders reached 20 billion USD by 2015, again double the amount of the previous year. In the Chinese P2P 
market in 2015, lending volume was about 982.304 billion CNY, a rise of 388% on the previous year’s figures.  The number 
of P2P platforms now stands at 2595 as reported by WDZJ.COM.  
 
provided by the borrowers and directly offer a loan that meets their investment criteria. P2P 
lending companies have taken a fee for providing the match-making platform and credit-
checking the borrower.  
An important function of lending markets is to screen borrowers and allocate credit 
efficiently based on the borrower’s creditworthiness. However, the market can break down 
due to the problem of information asymmetry that the borrowers and lenders may face 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Traditionally, as financial intermediaries, banks play a significant 
role in reducing information asymmetries because they are thought to have the financial 
expertise and extensive experience to evaluate the creditworthiness of borrowers and allocate 
capital accordingly (Diamond, 1984). In the P2P online lending market, transaction costs are 
reduced by eliminating expensive intermediaries, but as non-financial experts dominate in 
this pseudonymous online lending market, the problems associated with information 
asymmetry, particularly adverse selection, may become more severe than those that emerge in 
the traditional lending market (Lee and Lee, 2012). How to mitigate information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders is critical for the online lending market’s long-term success. 
Some research suggests that information asymmetry can, to some extent, be alleviated by the 
disclosure and analysis of the borrower’s soft information (e.g. Herzenstein and Andrews, 
2008; Iyer et al., 2009; Dorfleitner et al., 2016) and friendship and group networks (e.g. Chen 
et al., 2009; Lin, 2013; Liu et al., 2015; Bellefamme et al., 2015).  
The problems of information asymmetries are even more pronounced in the Chinese 
P2P online lending market. Unlike the case in the US and other western countries in which 
the credit scores of borrowers are directly provided by specialised and independent credit 
rating agencies, Chinese online platforms use their own credit rating system to assess the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, based on the information submitted by the borrowers 
themselves3. Because of the lack of any official and trustworthy credit records of borrowers, 
false or inaccurate information can easily pass through the online verification process. 
Therefore, the lenders may not fully trust the online credit assessment and verifications 
provided by Chinese P2P platforms.  
In order to enhance the trust between borrowers and lenders – and improve market 
efficiency –offline verification mechanisms have been developed and adopted by some 
Chinese online P2P lending platforms, such as Renrendai.com. They use offline investigation 
tools such as physical site visits and third-party referrals to verify the borrowers’ information 
and assess their credibility. The combination of online and offline authentication processes in 
the Chinese P2P lending market provides an excellent and unique opportunity for studying 
the role played by offline processes in electronic marketplaces. Therefore, we use a large 
sample of listings from one of the largest Chinese online P2P lending platforms, 
Renrendai.com, to examine how the offline process impacts on lenders’ financing decisions. 
Along with a focus on the role of offline authentication processes in the P2P lending market, 
we also investigate how borrowers’ hard financial information, soft information and loan 
characteristics impact on the loan outcomes, measured by the probability of successful 
funding, interest rates of loans, and the probability of loan default. 
As mentioned above, we find that borrowers who own cars or those earning higher 
incomes are more likely to receive a loan, pay lower interest rates, and are less likely to 
default. Our empirical results indicate that some lenders do not perceive that the credit grade 
provided by the lending platform is a reliable indicator of the borrower’s creditworthiness. 
We also find an inversely U-shaped relationship between interest rates and the probability of 
funding success. Moreover, we find that gender, educational and marital discrimination exists 
                                                             
3 The People’s Bank of China (the central bank) has started the collection of credit history of individuals and entities and 
calculating of credit scores, but the credit information is not shared with non-banking institutions, such as P2P lending 
platforms.   
in the market.  In addition, our results indicate that a screening process by means of the third 
party’s commitment to screen borrowers improves their (the borrower’s) access to credit. 
Also, the additional transaction costs raised by the offline process can be compensated by a 
lower interest rate charged on their borrowing. Finally, we find that the offline authentication 
process helps to reduce the taste-based discrimination in the P2P lending market, and that 
borrowers’ financial information has no impact on the probability of funding success for 
offline authentication listings.  
Firstly, this study contributes to the growing literature on alternative finance by 
exploring the rapidly developing P2P lending sector from the largest emerging market, China. 
Most existing studies focus on the leading US P2P lending platform, Prosper, which has made 
its data publicly available (e.g. Freedman and Jin, 2008; Weiss et al. 2010; Pope and Sydnor, 
2011; Ravina, 2008; Lin et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2016) and crowdfunding, another type of 
alternative financing activities (e.g. Belleflamme et al. 2015; Colombo et al. 2015; Cumming 
and Johan, 2016; Cumming and Zhang, 2016). Secondly, we extend asymmetry information 
theories by examining and explaining the effect of offline authentication processes on the P2P 
online lending market. The findings on the role of offline processes provide insights into a 
possible future trend in the online lending market. Thirdly, our paper also contributes the 
literature on big data analytics. Big data analytics helps organisations and individuals in more 
informed decision-marking and now drives almost every aspect of our modern society such 
as business intelligence (Chen et al. 2012), knowledge management (Hota et al. 2015), public 
sector (Klievink, et al. 2016), and healthcare (Kankanhalli et al. 2016). With the help of large 
volumes of data from a variety of sources, this research explores the main determinants of 
funding success, loan interest rate and default rate in order to provide practical guidance to 
borrowers in P2P online lending communities. Our findings shed light on which listing 
strategy is more effective and efficient for borrowers in successfully funding their request and 
which lending strategy is more effective for lenders in reducing default risk. Fourthly, we 
provide comprehensive background information on the history, recent development and 
lending mechanisms of the Chinese P2P lending platforms and afford interested parties a 
better understanding of this new and fast-growing P2P lending market. Last but not least, our 
study is related to crowdsourcing literature. Some prior studies focus on the roles and 
methods of crowdsourcing for disaster management (Poblet et al., 2017), the factors 
influencing the crowdsourcing decision (Thuan, et al. 2016) and designing a novel 
crowdsourcing intermediary system (Yuan and Hesieh, 2016). However, we provide some 
insight into the crowdsourcing process and outcome by conducting an analysis on a peer-to-
peer online lending platform, one of the important forms of crowdsourcing.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
empirical literature on P2P lending. Section 3 presents the development of the Chinese P2P 
lending market and the lending process of the Renrendai platform. While Section 4 describes 
the data made available by Renrendai.com, we develop and analyse the empirical model and 
discuss the empirical results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Related Literature Review 
In response to the growing popularity of P2P lending, a large amount of research in this 
area has emerged in recent years. Some studies investigate the reasons for – and economic 
impact of – the emergence of online P2P lending. Hulem and Wright (2006) study the first 
online lending platform – Zopa – and suggest that the emergence of online P2P lending is a 
direct response to social trends and a demand for new forms of financial services in the new 
financial technology age. Wang et al. (2009) find that P2P lending marketplaces could 
increase individual interactions and provide efficient information transfer, and thus perhaps 
create a more efficient market. Culkin et al. (2016) suggest that online peer-to-peer lending 
(and crowdfunding) has some advantages over more traditional sources of entrepreneurial 
finance and can facilitate start-up and small-firm growth. Fraser et al. (2015) also point that 
P2P lending may contribute to filling gaps in the supply of banking finance and may facilitate 
the flow of information among the borrowers and lenders, however, the exact role of the fund 
providers in the context of monitoring and governance remains somewhat unclear. Mild et al. 
(2015) and Guo et al. (2016) proposed some models to assess the credit risk of the online 
borrowers. Most of the previous studies have mainly focused on identifying the factors that 
determine the funding success, the interest, and/or the default rate. On a meta level, the 
factors can be classified into two broad categories: (1) hard information, e.g. borrowers’ 
credit scores and financial situation, and (2) soft information, e.g. demographic 
characteristics, social networks, photographs and descriptive text.  
Klafft (2008) analyses the data retrieved from Prosper and shows that borrowers’ credit 
ratings and verified bank account information significantly impact on the probability of 
successful funding. They also find that credit rating and debt-to-income ratios are key 
determinants for loan interest rates, but that verified bank account information and home 
ownership have almost no impact on interest rates. Similarly, Herzenstein and Andrews (2008) 
find borrowers’ credit ratings significantly impact upon the likelihood of funding success. 
Iyer et al. (2009) examine the impact of borrowers’ credit ratings on the interest rate of a 
funded loan; they find that lenders rely more on hard financial information to differentiate 
between borrowers within the higher credit rating categories, while delinquencies and other 
forms of soft data are more informative within the lower credit categories.   
Some studies also exploit data on the personal characteristics of borrowers to test 
theories of statistical and taste-based discrimination in the P2P lending market. Duarte et al. 
(2012), Pope and Sydnor (2011) and Ravina (2008) focus on facial attributes such as race and 
beauty of the borrowers, addressing the literature on racial bias and the beauty premium 
based on the data from Prosper. Duarte et al. (2012) and Ravina (2008) both find that 
borrowers with more positive characteristics – like trustworthiness and beauty – have a 
higher probability of having their loans funded and also tend to default on their loans less 
often. Pope and Sydnor (2011) present evidence for taste-based discrimination against blacks, 
the elderly and the overweight; these borrowers are less likely to secure loans and more likely 
to pay higher interest rates if they do. Loureiro and Gonzalez (2015) find that more attractive 
and financially successful borrowers of the same gender as lenders are less likely to have 
their loan requests filled and suggest that interpersonal competition significantly influences 
online lending decisions.  
There is much evidence that other soft information such as social networks and listing 
descriptions play significant roles in online P2P lending and help in mitigating asymmetric 
information. Berger and Gleisner (2009) analyse all listings on Prosper.com between 
November 2005 and September 2007 and find that the designated group leaders can act as 
intermediaries; this helps to reduce information symmetries and can lead to the group 
membership achieving significantly reduced borrowing costs. Similarly, Chen et al. (2009) 
reveal that the borrowers’ general group social capital (i.e. group membership) improves 
funding success and reduces interest rates and default probability, while Freedman and Jin 
(2008) find that loans endorsed by friends, and bids, show fewer missed bids have fewer 
missed) payments and higher rates of return. Using a sample of Prosper listings, Lin et al. 
(2013) examine the role that friendship networks played in the outcomes of loans on the P2P 
market. They find that the friendship can serve as an informational boost to a borrower’s 
credit quality, increase the probability of successful funding, and reduce the interest rate of 
loans and default risk on funded loans. Liu et al. (2015) also find that the borrowers’ friends, 
particularly close offline friends, are more likely to bid on the listings. 
In addition, Dorfleitner et al. (2016) study the relation between the soft information 
derived from the listing description and the lending outcomes based on data from two leading 
European P2P platforms. They find that spelling errors, text length and the presence of social 
and emotional keywords in the description text significantly negatively influence the 
likelihood of funding success, but are not significantly related to the default probability. Iyer 
et al. (2016) show that lenders rely on soft information such as the characteristics of listing 
text to infer borrowers’ creditworthiness, particularly when evaluating lower-quality 
borrowers. 
 
3. Institutional Background 
3.1 Chinese P2P lending market  
Since the first Chinese online P2P lending platform, ppdai.com, started operating in 
2007, this lending market has grown at a phenomenal rate and is currently the largest in the 
world. According to a report in China News4, as of the end of 2015, the sector was home to 
more than 2600 platforms and topped about 982.3 billion yuan or $149 billion, soaring from 
253 billion yuan in 2014 (see Figure 1 for more details). This rapid growth has been driven 
by the huge demand from individuals, households, small and micro-enterprises for access to 
Chinese finance; and by the supply of funds from retail investors. P2P loans typically carry 
hefty interest rates in the 10% to 20% range – that is three to six times higher than the bank 
deposit rate. According to data disclosed by WDZJ.com, average interest rates offered by the 
Chinese P2P platforms have significantly declined to around 13.29% in 2015 from nearly 
20% two years ago.   
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 
In China, the current regulatory requirements for P2P lending platforms are relatively 
                                                             
4 http://www.ecns.cn/business/2016/01-02/194408.shtml  
light. There has been no formal regulation from the central bank (People’s Bank of China) or 
banking regulator (Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission) until recently. The Chinese 
authorities introduced their first major guidance policy on internet finance in July 20155. 
According to the guidance, P2P lending providers should consider themselves as information 
intermediaries rather than credit intermediaries, and need to establish a third-party depository 
account for customer funds with a qualified banking institution (Deer, et al., 2015). This 
loose regulatory environment has proven to be a double-edged sword; it allowed the rapid 
growth of the P2P lending market, providing new entrepreneurial opportunities and bringing 
convenience to the borrowers, but loose regulation also made it easy for bad debtors to 
defraud unwary investors. For example, in early 2016, nearly a million investors lost $7.6 
billion through Chinese online 'Ponzi-like schemes' orchestrated by Ezubao, the country’s 
largest peer-to-peer lending service6. In response to the discovery of Ponzi schemes in several 
Chinese P2P platforms, tighter regulations on P2P lending are expected to promulgate soon.   
3.2 Renrendai.com 
Our analysis focuses on Renrendai.com which is a leading peer-to peer online lending 
platform in China. Renrendai was founded in 2010, and, by the end of 2015, it had confirmed 
more than 220,000 loans with a total lending amount of over 13.21 billion RMB (Chinese 
Currency) (see Figure 2 for more details).  
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 
In order to be considered for a loan from the Renrendai online lending platform, a 
potential borrower must file an application by providing his or her national ID number and 
other personal information so that Renrendai can authenticate the applicant’s identity, mobile 
                                                             
5 People’s Bank of China and 10 other Ministries and Commissions jointly issued “Guiding Opinions on Promoting the 
Healthy Development of Internet Finance” in 2015.   
6 See ft.com. Link: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ca011f4-c88f-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44.html#axzz4Di9nuZIy 
phone, address, employment status, and income. In the listing, the borrowers must describe 
the purpose of the loan, the requested loan amount, the interest rate they are willing to pay, 
the duration of the loan request, and any other information (including a photo and description 
of themselves) that they feel may help attract lenders to fund the loans. In addition, the 
platform also encourages potential borrowers to provide evidence about their home and car 
ownership status, education level, professional qualification, marital status, residential 
address, and other evidence/certifications that may help improve their credit scores and 
financing limits. Unlike many online lending platforms in Western countries which can pull 
the borrower’s credit history and score from professional credit rating agencies, Renrendai 
relies on its own credit rating model to assess borrowers’ credibility. Renrendai assesses and 
verifies the borrowers’ submitted information, also checking their historical credit 
information if they have the previous history of borrowing from Renrendai. A credit score is 
then assigned to each borrower. Based on the credit score, the lending platform further 
classifies every loan application into seven risk-grades starting with the safe AA, followed by 
Grades A through E, and finally HR (high risk).  
Because of the relative lack of trustworthy credit records and sophisticated credit rating 
models, lenders do not always fully trust the credit scores and grades posted by Renrendai. 
Therefore, in addition to the aforementioned pure online credit assessment system, the 
platform has also developed an offline credit assessment process to help lenders and 
borrowers establish trust and increase the number of successful applications. Renrendai seeks 
to establish a direct offline relationship with borrowers by first directing them to an offline 
branch managed by its sister company, Ucredit (www.ucredit.com), to submit application 
materials for the loan as part of its “offline authentication” process. When Ucredit receives 
loan applications, it screens applicants by undertaking physical site visits to verify borrowers’ 
information and then forwards the qualifying borrowers to Renrendai. Any offline referrals 
from Ucredit are automatically classified as Credit Grade A when they are listed in the online 
platform. This offline authentication process has grown in popularity due to its potential to 
alleviate asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. When Renrendai launched 
in 2010, it adopted a pure online operating model similar to that of the Lending Club. The 
platform now tends to rely much more on the offline operating model after integrating with 
offline lending service Ucredit in 2012. Approximately 89% of the loan amounts sourced in 
2015 are recorded as having completed offline authentication (See Figure 3 for more details 
on loan mix). Moreover, some potential borrowers also have an approved third-party credit 
guarantee company backing their bid and seeking raise funds on their behalf via Renrendai7.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As with borrowers, potential lenders must provide their national ID number, mobile 
phone number and bank information for Renrendai to verify their identity. Lenders can 
browse listings pages which include all of the borrowers’ information described above, and 
the percentage funded. After assessing this information, a potential lender can bid on a listing 
by specifying the amount of money he or she would like to contribute. The minimum bid 
requirement is 50 RMB. Most lenders limit their bids to a small amount on each loan and 
diversify their funds across many different loans. A listing will close once the total amount 
bid exceeds the borrower’s request.  
Renrendai charges fees for providing the match-making services between borrowers 
and lenders. There is no fee for posting a listing, although borrowers need to pay a closing fee 
                                                             
7 The smart-money is an intelligent lending feature that allows investors to automatically allocate their money 
across the listings by selecting their desired risk appetite and saving plan objectives. However, Renrendai 
stopped the smart-money lending mode at the end of 2012.   
when their loans are originated. The fee ranges from 0% to 5% depending on credit grade. In 
addition, borrowers are also charged a 0.3% annual serving fee based on the current 
outstanding loan principal. Except for a small cash transaction fee, the platform does not 
generally charge servicing fees for lenders. All Renrendai loans are uncollateralised, up to 36 
months, and fully amortised with fixed interest. Loan size can range from 3,000 RMB to 
500,000 RMB. Renrendai has also set up a risk reserve fund which is designed to cover 
borrowers’ missed and late loan repayments; this is constantly topped up using part of the fee 
paid by each borrower8. In the event of any missed payments by borrowers, the reserve fund 
makes the expected payments to lenders instead. If a repayment is overdue, the platform 
makes several attempts to recover the loan, including emailing, text messaging, and calling 
the borrower. After payment is overdue by two months or more, a collection agency takes 
charge of collecting the default. If money is subsequently recovered from borrowers, this is 
paid back into the reserve fund.  
 
4. Data and variables 
Our sample comprises all listings that sought funding on Renrendai.com between 1 
January 2013 and 31 December 2015. After dropping listings with missing variables, we 
arrive at a final sample consisting of 499,180 listings; of these, 197,743 listings had been 
successfully funded. Each listing and loan in our data set is associated with a number of 
variables that include all of the information seen by the lender when they made their lending 
decisions, as well as the outcome and performance of the listings/loans. These variables fall 
into six categories: (1) dependent variables to measure the outcome of a listing and the 
performance of a loan; (2) credit profile and financial information; (3) information describing 
                                                             
8 The Shanghai Branch of China Merchants’ Bank has been providing a custodian service for the risk reserve fund. of 
Renrendai.com and issues monthly report on its fund flows.  
the specific features of a listing/loan; (4) demographic information; (5) listing types, and (6) 
other control variables. A complete list of all variables obtained from Renrendai is 
summarised in Appendix A and their descriptive statistics are reported in Tables 1 and 2.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We construct three dependent variables in this empirical study to measure the outcomes 
of listings or loans. The first dependent variable (LISTSUC) is a binary variable to indicate 
whether the listing attracted enough bids and generated a loan. The second dependent 
variable is the interest rate charged on a funded loan (LRATE). The last dependent variable is 
a dummy variable to indicate whether a successful listing defaults (LDEF). According to 
Table 2, 40.4 % listings have been successfully funded. The average interest rate of the loans 
is 12%; this rate has varied over time, ranging from 8% to 24%. The default rate of loans is 
small and only 2,214 loans have been labelled as defaults in our sample.  
Many previous studies show that the hard credit and financial information of borrowers 
can impact upon their creditworthiness and affect lenders’ online lending decisions 
(Herzenstein and Andrews, 2008, Berger and Gleisner, 2009; Iyer et al., 2016). The credit 
rating grade is one of the most common indicators used by a lender to assess a borrower’s 
creditworthiness when making his or her lending decision. The Renrendai awards seven 
grades for borrowers, which range from AA to HR. To measure the impact of this factor, we 
include a full set of dummy variables for each credit grade (CRED).  Higher credit grades 
indicate a higher probability of the borrower paying back the loan, so we would expect the 
variable to have a positive influence on funding success. Meanwhile, since a higher credit 
score usually results in investors reducing their risk expectations, it should have the effect of 
decreasing the risk premium requested by investors; therefore the variable should have a 
negative impact on the loan interest rate.  
We also factor other hard credit information on the listing such as borrower’s income 
levels (INC) and credit line (CREDITL) into our regressions to proxy for the borrower’s 
financial standing.  In addition, following Duarte et al. (2012), we include variables to 
identify whether the borrower is a home (HOME) or car (CAR) owner, factors that can be 
considered indications of wealth or creditworthiness. According to Table 2, Renrendai is 
characterised by a dominance of applications in the lowest rating category HR (60.6%) and a 
scarcity of applications with the ‘medium’ Grades B-E (2.3%).  Of the borrowers, 37% and 
0.1% have been classified as good, rating A and AA, respectively. As expected, funded 
listings tend to have borrowers with better credit grades; 91.2% of the funded listings are 
Credit Grades AA and A while only 5.7% loans originate from successfully funded HR-
listings. Regarding the borrowers, 1.3% of their monthly incomes are below 2,000 CNY; 
84.3% claim that their monthly incomes range between 2,001 and 20,000; and 14.3% of 
borrowers’ monthly incomes are over 50,000.  
The characteristics of the loan application – for example, the interest rate that the 
borrower is willing to pay, the loan amount requested, and the loan length – are directly 
related to the return of the investment and are essential elements to be considered when the 
lender makes his lending decision. When a potential borrower creates a listing, he sets the 
interest rate he is willing to pay. The interest rate offered will to some extent reflect the 
borrower’s self-assessment of the fairness of his individual risk premium. A higher interest 
rate offered by the borrower can increase the listing’s attractiveness for more lenders and 
stimulate them to bid on the loan request; however, as the interest rate increases, the default 
risk increases as well which may reduce lenders’ profitability and subsequent incentive to bid 
on the listing. Therefore, we expect an inversely U-shaped relationship between the interest 
rates and the probability of funding success. Following Lin et al. (2013), we include the 
interest rate (LISTRATE) and its quadratic term (LISTRATE2) in our regressions to capture 
this relationship. We also incorporate two additional variables to measure the loan amount 
requested (LSIZE) and loan length (LLENGHT) which are related to risks and affect the 
lenders’ lending decisions (Herzenstein and Andrews, 2008; Chen et al., 2009). Comparing 
listings and loans, the average amount requested for listings is 62,278 CNY while the average 
loan size is 61,871yuan. The average loan length is higher for the successful listings (27.9 
months) than for all listings combined (21.27 months); it appears that lenders prefer listings 
with a larger loan size and a longer duration. The average interest rate that borrowers are 
willing to pay is 13%; this is slightly higher than the average contract rate of 12%.  
Some studies have found that a lender’s subjective assessment of a potential borrower’s 
creditworthiness correlates highly with the borrower’s demographic characteristics (e.g. Ladd, 
1982; Carr and Megbolugbe, 1993; Herzenstein and Andrews, 2008). Therefore, we would 
expect that the demographic information provided by the borrower is important in 
determining whether the listing gets funded and how much interest is charged. Following 
Pope and Syndnor (2011) and Barasinska and Schäfer (2010), we include an extensive set of 
variables to capture the borrower’s gender (FEMALE), age (AGE), educational background 
(EDU) and marital status (MAR). Of all listings, only 18.5% were female; the average age of 
borrowers was 33 years; 32.9% of borrowers had the lowest level of education (high school 
level education or lower), 44.3% had a college degree, and 21.5% had attained a Bachelor's 
degree, while only 1.4% of borrowers claimed to have an advanced degree (master’s degree 
or above). Of the potential borrowers, 56.9% were married, 36.2% were unmarried and 0.7% 
were divorced or widowed.   
One of the major problems of P2P lending is asymmetric information (Freedman and 
Jin, 2008; Lin et al., 2013). This problem is more pronounced in the Chinese P2P lending 
market due to the lack of reliable and comprehensive credit information. Chinese P2P lending 
platforms have developed a more diverse set of lending models compared to the case in the 
US and other countries in its response to the challenges of limited reliable credit information, 
the nature of investor risk, and different borrower segments (Deer et al., 2015). Renrendai has 
adopted three lending models – pure online, offline authentication and third-party referral 
lending models. The major difference between these lending models is the way they screen 
potential borrowers’ information. The first lending model relies purely on an online screening 
process, and not all borrower-provided information is verified. The other two models verify 
borrowers’ information via physical site visits in the first instance and third-party credit 
guarantee companies in the second. These additional screening efforts could significantly 
increase the reliability of information provided by the borrowers. Moreover, borrowers with 
better credit quality are more inclined to use offline processes to signal their creditworthiness 
to outside lenders. Therefore, these offline lending models can mitigate the problem of 
adverse selection, and we expect that offline authentication (OFFLINE) and third-party 
referral (GUAR) listings would more likely to attract funding at lower interest rates than 
would pure online listings (PURE). Among all the listings in the sample, there are 308,383 
(63%) pure online listings, 158,620 (32.5%) offline authentication listings and 22,177 (4.5%) 
third-party referral listings. Almost all offline authentication listings (158,438/158,620 = 
99.88%) and third-party referral listings (98.7%) are able to attract sufficient bids and secure 
funding; however, only 5.65% pure online listings had been successfully funded. 
We also include a number of control variables in our analysis. Some investors may 
favour credit bids on certain special loan categories, leading to a higher probability of a 
successful funding and a higher interest rate (Lin et al., 2013; Dorfleitner et al., 2016). We 
classify the intended purposes of loans into seven categories: debt consolidation, buying a 
house, bill payments, business loans, automobile loans, home improvement loans, medical 
loans, education loans, wedding loans and other loans. We include a full set of dummy 
variables for each loan category (LC) to control for investors’ preference. We see that 48.1% 
of all listings are debt consolidation, followed by bill payments (19.8%), home improvement 
(10.3%), and business loans (8%). We further include a set of dummy variables to control for 
the geographical region (REG) in which the loan applicant’s residence is located9. In addition, 
we include dummy variables to indicate the borrower’s employment status (EMP) and 
employment length (EMPYEAR); these factors can indirectly convey information about his or 
her financial situation and debt-servicing capabilities while also influencing both funding 
success and interest rate (see Iyer et al., 2016). Finally, following Dorfleitner et al. (2016), 
we include an additional control variable LTEXT, which comprises the number of words 
included to measure the length of the descriptive text. 
 
5. Empirical analysis and results  
5.1 Empirical models 
This study applies regression analysis in order to determine the factors that impact the 
probability of a listing being funded, as well as the interest rate and default probability of 
funded loans as the outcomes of the lending transaction in the P2P lending platform. We 
estimate the following model three specifications:  
0( 1 )
i
Probability FSUC x FinInfo LoanChart PersonalChart
ListType OtherCon
   
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            (Eq.1) 
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               (Eq.2) 
and 
                                                             
9 We divide China into six economic regions plus an extra category made up of four municipalities. The six regions are the 
centre and south (Henan, Hubei, Hunan, An'hui and Jiangxi), the east coast (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong and Hainan), the north (Inner Mongolia, Hebei and Shanxi), the northeast (Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang), the 
southwest (Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi and Tibet), and the northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang). The four municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. 
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           (Eq.3) 
where FSUC, LRATE and LDEF are the dependent variables which measure whether the 
listing had been successfully funded, the interest rate charged for the loan, and whether the 
loan defaulted respectively. FSUC and LDEF are both binary variables; hence, we use Probit 
regressions to estimate the probability that a listing is funded successfully (Eq. 1) and also the 
probability that a funded loan defaults (Eq. 3)10,11. Because the interest rate is bounded by 
zero and one, we use Tobit regression to estimate the equations 2. FinInfo denotes hard credit 
variables including credit grade dummies, credit line, income status and home and car 
ownership.  LoanChart describes the specific features of a listing including the amount 
requested, loan size, and the interest rate the borrower is willing to pay.  PersonalChart refers 
to personal characteristic variables including gender, age, educational background and marital 
status. ListType captures whether a listing belongs to pure online, offline authentication or 
third-party referral listings. OtherCon denotes a set of control variables including loan 
category, length of loan description, employment status, and borrowers’ residential areas. 
Finally, x represents the information set about the listing, and  is the random term. In the 
following sections, we assess how the above information impacts the lending outcomes in 
detail, based on our regression results.  
5.2 Funding probability  
Table 3 shows the Probit regression results for the model specifications with FSUC as a 
dependent variable (Eq.1). Models 1-4 incorporate exploratory variables FinInfo, LoanChart, 
PersonalChart and LendType separately, each together with the control variables. Model 5 
                                                             
10 In the sample, we find there are no defaults on the loans which were originated by the offline authentication and third-
party referral lending models. All default loans come from the loans which were funded based on the pure online lending 
process. Therefore, we examine the determinants of default probability based on the sample which only includes the loans 
made by the pure online lending process.   
11 We also use Logit models to estimate the probability that a listing is funded successfully and a loan default is used as a 
robustness check. The Logit regression results are consistent with those from the Probit models.     
represents the main funding probability model including all variables simultaneously.  
As expected, the hard financial variables have a significant impact on funding 
probability. The results in Table 3 show that the coefficients on credit rating variables are all 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that the HR rated listings are less likely to be 
funded than other, higher credit grade listings. However, in contrast to the findings of Lin et 
al. (2013) and Ravina (2008), it is interesting to note that the funding probability does not 
monotonically increase with the credit rating. Some low credit grade listings (e.g. E) seem to 
have higher probability of being funded than some better credit grade listings (e.g. C). This is 
probably due to the fact that, in the absence of a reliable and official credit information 
environment, Chinese P2P lenders may not fully trust the credit grades provided and also rely 
on other information to make their lending decisions.  In addition, we find that the borrower’s 
monthly income has a significantly positive effect on the probability of funding success, 
suggesting that investors make their lending decisions on the basis of the borrower’s income 
level. As the monthly income increases, all things being equal, the probability also increases. 
Car ownership has a significant positive effect on the borrower’s likelihood of funding 
success, although the effect is less significant than that of good credit grades and higher 
income levels.  
As discussed above, there may be a non-linear relation between the interest rate a 
borrower is willing to pay and the probability of funding success. In regressions 1 and 5, the 
coefficients on the level terms (LISTRATE) are statistically significantly positive, while the 
coefficients on the quadratic terms (LISTRATE2) become significantly negative. This 
constitutes an inversely U-shaped pattern, suggesting that a higher interest rate could increase 
the funding probability but, as the interest rate increases above a certain level, this effect may 
be swamped by the greater likelihood of default. High interest rates may indicate risky 
borrowers, who are less likely to be funded.  With regard to the loan amount requested, we 
find that the coefficients of LSIZE are negative and highly significant, suggesting that lenders 
tend to bid on small loans to diversify their risk. As the loan amount increases, the lenders’ 
assessments of borrowers’ ability to repay loans may be less favourable, reducing the 
probability of funding success (Herzenstein and Andrews, 2008). In addition, the results also 
show that the loan length has a significant and positive impact on the likelihood of getting a 
loan, and suggest that Chinese P2P lenders may prefer to bid on longer term loans in order to 
secure a high level of return for a longer period.    
Apart from the hard financial information and loan characteristics, we find some 
evidence of discrimination in the Chinese P2P lending market. The results show that the 
female and older borrowers were more likely to be successful in their loan requests. The 
coefficients on education variables are all positive and highly significant. This result indicates 
that borrowers with ‘better’ educational backgrounds are more likely to have their loan 
funded. Similarly, the coefficients on MAR2 are also positive and statistically significant, 
which suggests that lenders were more likely to deny loan requests from unmarried applicants 
compared to married applicants. It is worth noting that, although demographic characteristics 
– for example, gender, age, educational background and marital status – affect the likelihood 
of funding success, these effects are relatively small compared to the borrower’s financial 
information and loan characteristics.  
As we discussed above, some Chinese P2P lending platforms have developed a more 
diverse set of lending criteria in response to the challenges posed by the lack of reliable credit 
information on borrowers. Renrendai currently relies mainly on pure online (PURE), offline 
authentication (OFFLINE), and third-party referral (GUAR) processes to source borrowers 
and to verify borrowers’ information. As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on OFFLINE and 
GUAR are highly significant and positive; this suggests that the method of verifying credit 
information plays a very strong role in the lender’s decision-making process. The screening 
efforts undertaken by the offline physical site visits and the third-party credit guarantee 
companies lead to reduced adverse selection problems and a significantly increased 
probability of a loan’s successful funding.  From the perspective of borrowers, high-quality 
borrowers may also be required to undergo an offline authentication process to signal their 
creditworthiness, which in turn alleviates asymmetric information and attracts lenders to bid 
on these listings.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3 Interest rates on funded listings  
We next examine how borrowers’ information influences the interest rate charged to the 
borrower. As with funding probability, we regress the funded loan’s interest rate on the 
borrowers’ related variables. Models 1-4 incorporate exploratory variables FinInfo, 
LoanChart, PersonalChart, and ListType separately, each combined with the control variables. 
Model 5 represents the main interest rate model including all variables simultaneously. The 
results of the Tobit regression are illustrated in Table 4. In general, the results are consistent 
with those for funding probability.  
As shown in Table 4, the borrowers with the highest credit grades (AA and A) pay 
significantly lower interest rates than other lower credit grade borrowers, except the Grade E. 
Surprisingly, we find that the Credit Grade E borrowers seem to pay the lowest interest rates 
and the medium quality credit borrowers (B and C) pay the highest interest rates. The results 
indicate that Chinese P2P lenders may not perceive the credit grade provided by the platform 
as a good indicator of the creditworthiness of the borrower, and their investment decisions are 
also likely to be affected by other factors. As expected, higher income borrowers (INC1-INC6) 
pay significantly lower interest rates than the lowest income range (less than 1,000 RMB). 
However, the interest rates paid by the borrowers whose income levels are within the INC1 to 
INC6 ranges are not significantly different. In addition, we find that, on average, car-owning 
borrowers pay 10 basis points (or 0.1%) more interest rate than borrowers without cars, while 
home ownership has the opposite effect: having a home decreases the interest rate by about 
0.1% compared to the base group.    
The coefficients on LSIZE are negative and highly statistically significant, suggesting 
that the higher the loan amount requested, the higher the interest rate. As expected, we also 
find that the borrowing period has a significantly positive effect on the interest rate, 
suggesting that the longer the term to maturity, the higher the interest rate.  This is probably 
due to the fact that, since longer period loans are generally subject to greater interest rates and 
credit and liquidity risks, additional risk premiums will be required.  
Regarding borrower attributes, the coefficients on FEMALE and AGE are rather small 
and almost equal to zero in Model 5, suggesting that the borrowers’ gender and age have little 
effect on the interest rates paid. However, the estimated coefficients on the education 
background are sensible and highly statistically significant. Compared to the base group of 
borrowers who have only completed secondary education, those who have college degrees 
pay 0.1% less interest, while those who have Bachelor’s or higher degrees pay 0.2% less 
interest. Although we previously found that the single borrowers are more likely to have their 
loans funded, on average, they have to pay 0.1% more interest than groups of borrowers. 
Taken together, the effects of these personal characteristics are statistically significant but 
their economic magnitude is very small.   
Finally, we find that the coefficients associated with OFFLINE and GUAR are negative 
and highly statistically significant. As shown in Model 5, the loans originated through the 
offline authentication process and the third-party referral have lower interest rates compared 
to the loans relying solely on the pure online process; by 1% and 1.8%, respectively. The 
results suggest that the P2P lending models are the most important factors affecting the 
interest rate charged to the borrower, and that the use of the offline process (the offline 
authentication and third-party credit guarantee) can significantly reduce the asymmetric 
information.      
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.4 Probability of default   
The previous sections have shown how hard financial information, personal 
information, and loan features affect funding probability and the interest rate charged. It is 
also of interest to us to examine whether these characteristics have any impact on the 
probability of default. Our data cover all the loans originated between January 2013 and 
December 2015, under either repayments or default; these data show that all defaults come 
from the pure online-originated loans; therefore our analysis focuses exclusively on the pure 
online loans and excludes the offline-originated loans from the sample.  Table 5 reports the 
Probit model estimations for the default probability.     
For the credit rating variables, we find that the two extreme Credit Grades (HR and AA) 
are less likely to default while Grades B and D are more likely to default. The results suggest 
that credit grade is not a good predictor of default. Moreover, all coefficients on borrowers’ 
income levels are statistically insignificant thus suggesting that this factor is not related to the 
default probability when all the other characteristics are taken into account.  
As with funding probability, interest rate exhibits a non-linear relationship with default 
probability, suggesting that in the low-level interest rate range, increasing the interest rate 
reduces the default probability but, once the rate increases above a certain level, the high 
rates are associated with risky borrowers who tend to default on the loan. We also find that 
the short period loans are associated with lower odds of default; however, we do not find that 
loan size has a significant impact on the default probability.   
The results also show that, all things being equal, female and older borrowers are more 
likely to default.  The coefficients on the education dummy variables are positive and 
statistically significant, and indicate that borrowers with a higher education background may 
tend to take more risks and therefore have a higher default probability.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.5 Pure online versus offline authentication processes 
One of the most important findings in the previous sections is that the offline 
authentication processes could significantly alleviate the problem of asymmetric information 
and influence the lenders’ lending decisions. It is therefore natural to expect that the impacts 
of borrowers’ financial information, personal attributes and loan characteristics on the 
probability of funding success and the interest rate of funded loans are different depending on 
whether the authentication listings/loans are online or offline. To test these expectations, we 
re-estimate Equations 1 and 2 based on pure online and offline authentication sub-samples.  
The regression estimations are reported in Table 6. The second and third columns report the 
Probit regression results of the probability of funding success based on the sub-samples of 
offline authentication and pure online listings, respectively.  The fourth and fifth columns 
report the Tobit regression results of the interest rate charged, based on the sub-samples of 
offline authentication and pure online listings, respectively.   
As expected, our results show that the impacts of borrowers’ financial information, 
personal attributes and loan characteristics on the probability of successful funding differ 
significantly between the pure online and the offline authentication listing groups. Estimates 
for the pure online sub-sample remain basically unchanged from the results based on the full 
sample; however, the estimates for the offline sub-sample have largely changed and many of 
them become statistically insignificant. We find that the coefficients associated with the 
financial information variables are no longer statistically significant, suggesting that the 
borrower’s income, car ownership and home ownership have no significant effect on the 
probability of funding success. Similarly, the coefficients associated with gender, education 
background and marital status become insignificant or less statistically significant. These 
results indicate that the offline authentication process could help to reduce taste-based 
discrimination which is often found in credit markets (see Ross and Yinger, 2004; Pope and 
Sydnor, 2011). We also find that an offline listing with a low interest rate is less likely to be 
funded but that, once the interest rate increases to a certain high level, the likelihood of 
funding success significantly increase.  In addition, the results show positive relationships 
between the loan amount requested, loan length, and funding probability – but these effects 
are not statistically significant.   
In contrast with the funding probability, we do not find a much significant difference in 
the impact of the borrowers’ information on the funded loan’s interest rate between the pure 
online and the offline authentication loan groups. The estimates for these sub-samples show 
nearly the same impact directions and statistically significant levels, and are highly consistent 
with our prior findings based on the whole sample. However, it is worth noting that the 
magnitude of coefficients associated with income-related variables in the offline 
authentication sub-sample is much smaller than that of the coefficients associated with the 
pure online sub-sample. The results suggest that the borrowers’ income levels have a stronger 
impact on the interest rates of pure online loans that on those of offline authentication loans.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
6 Conclusion  
Online P2P lending is an unsecured lending activity between lenders and borrowers 
through online platforms without the involvement of financial institutions. It is designed to 
supplement traditional bank lending in order to meet the small-loan needs of individuals and 
SMEs. In order to enhance the trust between borrowers and lenders –and improve market 
efficiency–an offline verification mechanism has been developed and adopted by some 
Chinese online P2P lending platforms. The combination of online and offline authentication 
processes in the Chinese P2P lending market provides an excellent and unique opportunity 
for studying the role played by offline processes in electronic marketplaces.  
This paper uses a large sample of listings from one of the largest Chinese online P2P 
lending platforms, Renrendai.com, between 1January 2013 and 31 December 2015, to study 
how borrowers’ financial and personal information, loan characteristics and lending models 
affect the P2P loan funding outcomes measured by the probability of successful funding, 
interest rate of loans, and the probability of loan default.  
This research sheds light on the role of the offline process on the online P2P lending 
market. Our results indicate that a screening process by means of the third party’s 
commitment to screen borrowers improves the borrowers’ access to credit, and the additional 
transaction costs raised by the offline process can be compensated by a lower interest rate 
charged on their borrowing. The offline process can reduce information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders.  Moreover, we find that the offline authentication process helps to 
reduce the taste-based discrimination in the P2P lending market, and borrowers’ financial 
information has no impact on the probability of funding success for offline authentication 
listings. One of the important implications emerging from this study is its suggestion that 
online P2P lending platforms adopt a more diverse lending models including both online and 
offline lending checking processes which will help to mitigate the problems of asymmetry 
information in P2P lending markets.   
Our study makes contributions to the literature in the following four aspects. Firstly, this 
study contributes the growing body of literature on alternative finance by exploring the 
rapidly developing P2P lending sector from the largest emerging market – China. Secondly, 
we extend asymmetry information theories by examining and explaining the effect of offline 
authentication processes on the P2P online lending market. The findings on the role of offline 
processes provide insights into a possible future trend in the online lending market domain. 
Thirdly, this research explores the main determinants of funding success and loan interest rate 
in order to provide practical guidance to borrowers in P2P lending communities. The findings 
shed light on which listing strategy is more effective for borrowers in successfully funding 
their request. Finally, we provide comprehensive background information on the history, 
recent development and lending mechanisms of the Chinese P2P lending platforms and afford 
interested parties a better understanding of this new and fast-growing P2P lending market.  
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Fig. 1 China’s P2P lending market 
  
Source: WDZJ.COM 
 
Fig. 2 Cumulative lending amounts over time (2010-2015) 
 
Source: The annual reports of Renrendai (2011-2015)  
 
Fig. 3 The proportion of lending made by different lending operating models 
 
Source: The annual reports of Renrendai (2011-2015) 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics for listings 
 All listings  Offline authentication  Third-party guarantee  Pure online 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max  N Mean SD  N Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Listing Outcome                  
LISTSUC 197,743 0.404 0.491 0.000 1.000  158,438 0.999 0.034  21,889 0.987 0.113  17,416 0.056 0.231 
Loan Characteristics                 
LSIZE 489,180 10.544 1.062 6.908 13.816  158,620 11.008 0.472  22,177 10.713 0.616  308,383 10.293 1.213 
LISTRATE 489,180 0.130 0.025 0.070 0.240  158,620 0.121 0.009  22,177 0.111 0.010  308,383 0.135 0.029 
LLENGTH 489,180 21.270 11.036 1.000 48.000  158,620 30.673 7.672  22,177 19.450 8.105  308,383 16.564 9.505 
Borrower Characteristics                 
FEMALE 90445 0.185 0.388 0.000 1.000  46,097 0.291 0.454  5,559 0.251 0.433  38,789 0.126 0.332 
AGE 489180 33.033 8.001 17.000 74.000  158,620 37.152 8.503  22,177 38.124 8.474  308,383 30.548 6.513 
EDU0 160,699 0.329 0.470 0.000 1.000  40,494 0.255 0.436  4,653 0.210 0.407  11,5552 0.375 0.484 
EDU1 216,576 0.443 0.497 0.000 1.000  80,150 0.505 0.500  12,232 0.552 0.497  12,4194 0.403 0.490 
EDU2 105,292 0.215 0.411 0.000 1.000  35,922 0.226 0.419  4,992 0.225 0.418  64,378 0.209 0.406 
EDU3 6,613 0.014 0.115 0.000 1.000  2,054 0.013 0.113  300 0.014 0.116  4,259 0.014 0.117 
MAR0 176,871 0.362 0.480 0.000 1.000  25,911 0.163 0.370  4,244 0.191 0.393  146,716 0.476 0.499 
MAR1 278,246 0.569 0.495 0.000 1.000  114,480 0.722 0.448  16,831 0.759 0.428  146,935 0.476 0.499 
MAR2 32,733 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000  17,382 0.110 0.312  1,073 0.048 0.215  14,278 0.046 0.210 
MAR3 1,330 0.003 0.052 0.000 1.000  847 0.005 0.073  29 0.001 0.036  454 0.001 0.038 
Credit information                 
CREDAA 316 0.001 0.025 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  316 0.001 0.032 
CREDA 180,893 0.370 0.483 0.000 1.000  158,620 1.000 0.003  22,168 1.000 0.020  105 0.000 0.018 
CREDB 503 0.001 0.032 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  503 0.002 0.040 
CREDC 1,046 0.002 0.046 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  9 0.000 0.020  1,037 0.003 0.058 
CREDD 4,111 0.008 0.091 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  4,111 0.013 0.115 
CREDE 5,856 0.012 0.109 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  5,856 0.019 0.136 
CREDHR 296,455 0.606 0.489 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  296,455 0.961 0.193 
INC0 1,140 0.002 0.048 0.000 1.000  191 0.001 0.035  4 0.000 0.013  945 0.003 0.055 
INC1 5,203 0.011 0.103 0.000 1.000  131 0.001 0.029  13 0.001 0.024  5,059 0.016 0.127 
INC2 172,190 0.352 0.478 0.000 1.000  39,145 0.247 0.431  4,360 0.197 0.397  128,685 0.417 0.493 
INC3 169,887 0.347 0.476 0.000 1.000  64,515 0.407 0.491  2,772 0.125 0.331  102,600 0.333 0.471 
INC4 70,651 0.144 0.352 0.000 1.000  24,689 0.156 0.363  8,852 0.399 0.490  37,110 0.120 0.325 
INC5 42,960 0.088 0.283 0.000 1.000  17,416 0.110 0.313  4,800 0.216 0.412  20,744 0.067 0.250 
INC6 27,149 0.055 0.229 0.000 1.000  12,533 0.079 0.270  1,376 0.062 0.241  13,240 0.043 0.203 
CREDITL 489,180 4.020 5.231 0.000 13.459  158,620 9.385 3.979  22,177 7.252 5.047  308,383 1.028 2.988 
HOME 99,183 0.203 0.402 0.000 1.000  94,375 0.288 0.453  3,318 0.068 0.252  126,457 0.169 0.374 
CAR 224,150 0.458 0.498 0.000 1.000  45,701 0.595 0.491  1,507 0.150 0.357  51,975 0.410 0.492 
Lending Models                  
PURE 308,383 0.630 0.483 0.000 1.000             
OFFLINE 158,620 0.325 0.468 0.000 1.000             
GUAR 22,177 0.045 0.208 0.000 1.000             
Note: Table 1 presents summary statistics for the four samples of listings. For each variable, we report the number of observations (N), the mean, and the standard deviation, as well as the 
minimum and maximum values. To save space, summary statistics for the control variables are omitted and available upon request. 
Table 2 Summary statistics for funded loans 
 
All loans  Offline authentication  Third-party guarantee  Pure online 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max  N Mean SD  N Mean SD  N Mean SD 
Loan outcome                 
LRATE 197,743 0.120 0.011 0.070 0.240  158,438 0.121 0.009  21,889 0.111 0.010  17,416 0.124 0.018 
LDEF 2,214 0.011 0.105 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  2,214 0.127 0.333 
loan Characteristics                 
LSIZE 197,743 10.854 0.652 8.006 13.122  158,438 11.008 0.472  21,889 10.712 0.618  17,416 9.626 0.753 
LLENGTH 197,743 27.916 9.666 3.000 48.000  158,438 30.674 7.673  21,889 19.466 8.125  17,416 13.453 8.605 
Borrower Characteristics                 
FEMALE 53,579 0.271 0.444 0.000 1.000  46,031 0.291 0.454  5,476 0.250 0.433  2,072 0.119 0.324 
AGE 197,743 36.834 8.480 20.000 66.000  158,438 37.155 8.503  21,889 38.140 8.477  17,416 32.269 6.665 
EDU0 49,105 0.248 0.432 0.000 1.000  40,444 0.255 0.436  4,582 0.209 0.407  4,079 0.234 0.424 
EDU1 99,332 0.502 0.500 0.000 1.000  80,055 0.505 0.500  12,088 0.552 0.497  7,189 0.413 0.492 
EDU2 46,457 0.235 0.424 0.000 1.000  35,888 0.227 0.419  4,926 0.225 0.418  5,643 0.324 0.468 
EDU3 2,849 0.014 0.119 0.000 1.000  2,051 0.013 0.113  293 0.013 0.115  505 0.029 0.168 
MAR0 36,619 0.185 0.388 0.000 1.000  25,883 0.163 0.370  4,175 0.191 0.393  6,561 0.377 0.485 
MAR1 141,096 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000  114,359 0.722 0.448  16,616 0.759 0.428  10,121 0.581 0.493 
MAR2 19,142 0.097 0.296 0.000 1.000  17,349 0.110 0.312  1,069 0.049 0.216  724 0.042 0.200 
MAR3 886 0.004 0.067 0.000 1.000  847 0.005 0.073  29 0.001 0.036  10 0.001 0.024 
Credit Information                 
CREDAA 172 0.001 0.029 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  172 0.010 0.099 
CREDA 180,385 0.912 0.283 0.000 1.000  158,438 1.000 0.000  21,880 1.000 0.020  67 0.004 0.062 
CREDB 248 0.001 0.035 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  248 0.014 0.118 
CREDC 476 0.002 0.049 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  9 0.000 0.020  467 0.027 0.162 
CREDD 1,928 0.010 0.098 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  1,928 0.111 0.314 
CREDE 3,233 0.016 0.127 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  3,233 0.186 0.389 
CREDHR 11,301 0.057 0.232 0.000 1.000  0 0.000 0.000  0 0.000 0.000  11,301 0.649 0.477 
INC0 200 0.001 0.032 0.000 1.000  191 0.001 0.035  4 0.000 0.014  5 0.000 0.017 
INC1 175 0.001 0.030 0.000 1.000  131 0.001 0.029  13 0.001 0.024  31 0.002 0.042 
INC2 49,794 0.252 0.434 0.000 1.000  39,076 0.247 0.431  4,300 0.196 0.397  6,418 0.369 0.482 
INC3 72,726 0.368 0.482 0.000 1.000  64,442 0.407 0.491  2,692 0.123 0.328  5,592 0.321 0.467 
INC4 35,695 0.181 0.385 0.000 1.000  24,665 0.156 0.363  8,776 0.401 0.490  2,254 0.129 0.336 
INC5 23,925 0.121 0.326 0.000 1.000  17,407 0.110 0.313  4,744 0.217 0.412  1,774 0.102 0.302 
INC6 15,228 0.077 0.267 0.000 1.000  12,526 0.079 0.270  1,360 0.062 0.241  1,342 0.077 0.267 
SCORE 196,704 5.129 0.304 0.000 5.501  158,438 5.193 0.001  21,889 5.194 0.007  16,377 4.425 0.756 
CREDITL 197,743 9.117 4.065 0.000 13.459  158,438 9.384 3.980  21,889 7.212 5.062  17,416 9.091 2.462 
HOME 51,810 0.262 0.440 0.000 1.000  94,261 0.288 0.453  3,263 0.068 0.251  8,938 0.268 0.443 
CAR 106,462 0.538 0.499 0.000 1.000  45,656 0.595 0.491  1,482 0.149 0.356  4,672 0.513 0.500 
Lending Models                 
PURE 17,416 0.088 0.283 0.000 1.000             
OFFLINE 158,438 0.801 0.399 0.000 1.000             
GUAR 21,889 0.111 0.314 0.000 1.000             
                  
Note: Table 2 presents summary statistics for the four samples of loans. For each variable, we report the number of observations (N), the mean, and the standard deviation, as well as the 
minimum and maximum values. To save space, summary statistics for the control variables are omitted and available upon request. 
Table 3 Logit regression results of the probability of funding 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
CREDAA 1.801*** 
(0.072) 
   1.376*** 
(0.074) 
CREDA 4.660*** 
(0.019) 
   1.878*** 
(0.130) 
CREDB 1.667*** 
(0.057) 
   1.538*** 
(0.059) 
CREDC 1.546*** 
(0.040) 
   1.370*** 
(0.042) 
CREDD 1.607*** 
(0.020) 
   1.482*** 
(0.022) 
CREDE 1.836*** 
(0.017) 
   1.783*** 
(0.019) 
CAR 0.129*** 
(0.010) 
   0.170*** 
(0.012) 
HOME 0.079*** 
(0.009) 
   0.008 
(0.010) 
INC1 -0.088 
(0.133) 
   -0.049 
(0.145) 
INC2 0.579*** 
(0.118) 
   0.764*** 
(0.130) 
INC3 0.604*** 
(0.118) 
   0.919*** 
(0.130) 
INC4 0.637*** 
(0.118) 
   1.106*** 
(0.130) 
INC5 0.754*** 
(0.119) 
   1.377*** 
(0.131) 
INC6 0.849*** 
(0.119) 
   1.647*** 
(0.132) 
LSIZE  -0.233*** 
(0.004) 
  -0.501*** 
(0.005) 
LISTRATE  110.441*** 
(1.238) 
  33.676*** 
(1.988) 
LISTRATE2  -262.566*** 
(4.152) 
  -141.887*** 
(6.799) 
LLENGTH  0.075*** 
(0.000) 
  0.005*** 
(0.001) 
FEMALE   0.307*** 
(0.007) 
 0.027** 
(0.013) 
AGE   0.042*** 
(0.000) 
 0.017*** 
(0.001) 
EDU1   0.337*** 
(0.006) 
 0.211*** 
(0.011) 
EDU2   0.398*** 
(0.007) 
 0.379*** 
(0.012) 
EDU3   0.354*** 
(0.021) 
 0.363*** 
(0.032) 
MAR1   0.394*** 
(0.006) 
 0.080*** 
(0.010) 
MAR2   0.246*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.041* 
(0.022) 
MAR3   0.098* 
(0.053) 
 -0.239* 
(0.122) 
OFFLINE    4.943*** 
(0.026) 
3.545*** 
(0.133) 
GUAR    3.643*** 
(0.026) 
2.001*** 
(0.133) 
Other controls  Included in estimation  
No. of Obs. 489,180 489,180 489,180 489,180 489,180 
Notes: For brevity, some covariates are not shown. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote that an estimate is significantly different from zero 
at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
Table 4 Tobit Regression results of the interest rates on funded listings 
 MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 
CREDAA -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
CREDA -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.002** 
(0.001) 
CREDB 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
CREDC 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
 0.004*** 
(0.000) 
CREDD -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
CREDE -0.007*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
CAR 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
HOME 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
INC1 -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
INC2 -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
INC3 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
INC4 -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
INC5 -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
INC6 -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
LSIZE  -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
LLENGTH  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FEMALE  0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
AGE  0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
EDU1  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EDU2  -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
EDU3  -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
MAR1  0.000*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
MAR2  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
MAR3  0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
OFFLINE   -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
GUAR   -0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Other controls Included in estimation 
No. of Obs. 197,743 197,743 197,743 197,743 197,743 
Notes: For brevity, some covariates are not shown. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote that an estimate is significantly different from zero 
at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively.   
Table 5 Logit Regression results of the probability of default 
 MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 
CREDAA 5.923 
        (2153.256) 
  6.103 
     （2070.928） 
CREDA 0.955*** 
(0.250) 
  0.649** 
（0.265） 
CREDB 2.036*** 
(0.353) 
  1.980*** 
（0.360） 
CREDC 1.129*** 
(0.118) 
  1.129*** 
（0.128） 
CREDD 1.630*** 
(0.094) 
  1.599*** 
（0.104） 
CREDE 1.484*** 
(0.070) 
  1.454*** 
（0.092） 
CAR 0.103*** 
(0.035) 
  -0.065* 
（0.039） 
HOME 0.077*** 
(0.029) 
  0.102*** 
（0.034） 
INC1 -5.775 
       (12054.840) 
  -6.180 
    （11249.570） 
INC2 -5.547 
       (12054.840) 
  -5.992 
    （11249.570） 
INC3 -5.708 
       (12054.840) 
  -6.046 
    （11249.570） 
INC4 -5.728 
      (12054.840) 
  -6.245 
     （11249.570） 
INC5 -5.907 
       (12054.840) 
  -6.464 
     （11249.570） 
INC6 -5.996 
       (12054.840) 
  -6.505 
      （11249.570） 
LSIZE  0.008 
(0.021) 
 -0.001 
（0.028） 
LISTRATE  -31.438*** 
(5.270) 
 -37.732*** 
（6.261） 
LISTRATE2  75.856*** 
(17.575) 
 87.519*** 
（20.500） 
LLENGTH  -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.008*** 
（0.002） 
FEMALE   0.084** 
(0.040) 
0.161*** 
（0.049） 
AGE   -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
（0.003） 
EDU1   0.192*** 
(0.030) 
0.151*** 
（0.036） 
EDU2   0.595*** 
(0.036) 
0.438*** 
（0.043） 
EDU3   0.873*** 
(0.104) 
0.680*** 
（0.130） 
MAR1   0.002 
(0.031) 
0.017 
（0.038） 
MAR2   -0.290*** 
(0.062) 
-0.173** 
（0.072） 
MAR3   -0.320 
(0.435) 
-0.173 
（0.518） 
Other controls Included in estimation 
Log likelihood -5624.970 -6249.650 -6258.170 -4440.060 
No. of Obs. 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 
Notes: For brevity, some covariates are not shown. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote that an estimate is significantly different from zero 
at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. 
Table 6 Regression results for online and offline sub-samples 
 Funding success  Interest rate 
OFFLINE ONLINE OFFLINE ONLINE 
CREDAA  1.372*** 
(0.074) 
 -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
CREDA  1.847*** 
(0.132) 
 -0.004* 
(0.002) 
CREDB  1.535*** 
(0.060) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
CREDC  1.362*** 
(0.042) 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
CREDD  1.478*** 
(0.022) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
CREDE  1.780*** 
(0.019) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
CAR 0.060 
(0.056) 
0.183*** 
(0.012) 
 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
HOME -0.083 
(0.057) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
INC1 0.257 
(1763.996) 
0.061 
(0.176) 
 -0.011*** 
(0.000) 
-0.028*** 
(0.008) 
INC2 -2.995 
(1117.072) 
0.903*** 
(0.162) 
 -0.008***` 
(0.000) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
INC3 -2.913 
(1117.072) 
1.069*** 
(0.162) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
INC4 -2.959 
(1117.072) 
1.244*** 
(0.162) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
INC5 -2.843 
(1117.072) 
1.561*** 
(0.163) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
INC6 -2.937 
(1117.072) 
1.841*** 
(0.164) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
LSIZE 0.110* 
(0.067) 
-0.516*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
LISTRATE -899.165*** 
(131.008) 
29.166*** 
(2.023) 
  
LISTRATE2 3782.664*** 
(548.064) 
-127.501*** 
(6.884) 
  
LLENGTH 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
FEMALE -0.072 
(0.051) 
0.038*** 
(0.014) 
 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
AGE 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
EDU1 0.059 
(0.056) 
0.217*** 
(0.011) 
 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
EDU2 0.097 
(0.072) 
0.392*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
EDU3 -0.073 
(0.198) 
0.385*** 
(0.033) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
MAR1 -0.124* 
(0.072) 
0.078*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
MAR2 -0.325*** 
(0.093) 
-0.047** 
(0.024) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
MAR3 3.220 
(557.924) 
-0.385** 
(0.154) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Other controls Included in estimation 
No. of Obs.     158,620      308,383        158,438       17,416 
Notes: For brevity, some covariates are not shown. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote that an estimate is significantly different from zero 
at the10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively 
Appendix: Variables and Definitions 
Variable name  Description 
Outcomes  
Funding success (LISTSUC) A dummy variable, 1 if the listing was fully funded and approved; 0 otherwise. 
Loan’s interest rate (LRATE) The interest rate on funded loan.  
Loan default (LDEF) A dummy variable, 1 if the successful listing defaults; 0 otherwise. 
Loan Characteristics 
Loan size (LSIZE) Logarithm of loan amount requested by the borrower. 
Loan length (LLENGTH) The number of months the borrower would like to pay off the loan. 
Listing’s interest rate 
(LISTRATE & LISTRATE2) 
The interest rate specified by the borrower at time of listing and its quadratic term.  
Personal Characteristics 
Gender (FEMALE) A dummy variable, 1 if the borrower is female; 0 otherwise. 
Age (AGE) The age of the borrower. 
Education dummies (EDUn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the education level that the borrower specified, where n 
= 0 (high school or lower, this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 (junior 
college), 2 (undergraduate), and 3 (Master’s degree or above).  
Marital status dummies 
(MARn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the martial status that the borrower specified, where n = 
0 (unmarried; this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 (married), 2 (divorced) and 
3 (widow).  
Listing types 
Pure online listings 
(ONLINE)  
This is the baseline and is not included in regressions.  
Offline authentication listings 
(OFFLINE) 
A dummy variable, 1 if the borrower’s information has been verified through the offline 
authentication process; 0 otherwise.     
Referrals from third-party 
credit guarantee companies 
(GUAR) 
A dummy variable, 1 if the listing is an offline referral from third-party credit companies; 0 
otherwise.   
Hard financial information 
Credit grade dummies 
(CREDn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the borrower’s credit grade, where n = AA (credit grade 
is AA,), A (credit grade is A), B (credit grade is B), C (credit grade is C), D (credit grade is D), 
E (credit grade is E), and HR (credit grade is HR; this is the baseline and not included in 
regressions). 
Personal monthly income 
dummies (INCn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the monthly income range that the borrower specified, 
where n = 0 (less than 1,000 RMB, this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 
(between 1,000 and 2,000 RMB), 2 (between 2,001 and 5,000 RMB), 3 (between 5,001 and 
10,000 RMB), 4 (between10,001 and 20,000 RMB), 5 (between 20,001 and 50,000 RMB) and 
6 (over 50,000 RMB). 
Home owner (HOME)  A dummy variable 1, if the borrower owns a house; 0 otherwise. 
Car owner (CAR) A dummy variable 1 if the borrower owns a car; 0 otherwise.  
Other control variables 
 
Loan category dummies 
(LCn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the reason for borrowing that the borrower specified, 
where n = 0 (consolidate debt; this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 (buying a 
house), 2 (bill payments), 3 (business loans), 4 (automobile loans), 5 (home improvement), 6 
(medical loans), 7 (education loans), 8 (wedding loans), and 9 (other loans).  
Length of loan description 
(LTEXT) 
Logarithm of the total length of text on the borrower’s listing.  
Employment status(EMPn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the employment status that the borrower specified, 
where n = 0 (runs online business; this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 
(wage/salary earner), 2 (self-employed) and 3(others). 
Length of employment status 
dummies (EMPYEAR) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the range of borrower employment length in years, 
where n = 0 (less than 1 year; this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 (between 1 
and 3 years), 2 (between 4 and 5 years), and 3 (over 5 years). 
Geographical region 
dummies (REGn) 
A series of dummy variables indicating the region the borrower comes from, where n = 0 
(Centre and south; this is the baseline and not included in regressions), 1 (east coast), 2 (north), 
3 (southwest), 4 (northeast), 5 (northwest), and 6 (municipalities). 
 
